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Abstract 
The complex zone of what I refer to as the aesthetical absurd is examined in the works of Mod-
ernists Kafka, Giacometti, and Beckett. This aesthetic zone, addressed through cognitive poet-
ics, exists between artistic notion, the artist’s ideal cognitive image, and the actual performance 
or resulting image born in reality. Artistic ideal is evaluated as the aesthetic image or notion that 
exists in a tentative nascent and emotive state, but one that the artist strives to produce in the 
world—to reconstruct from the cognitive zone of creativity—but at times fails to bring to com-
pletion or fruition. This ever present bifurcation between these two conflictive states leads to a 
new view of the Sisyphean absurd. Kafka stands as the beginning point of the discussion. His 
fragmented, at times incomplete, writing serves as a touchstone to position the aesthetics of the 
later Beckett and Giacometti, a sculptor. Beckett mirrors Kafka’s sensibility, and relates his neg-
ative aesthetic, one lacking or hiding any visible scaffolding for the artistic process. Beckett and 
Giacometti were friends and collaborated on crafting props for a staging of his signature play 
Waiting for Godot, a failed attempt. An assessment of the aesthetics of these three artists advances 
the understanding of their works in terms of the aesthetical absurd. 
Keywords 
Kafka, Giacometti, Beckett, aesthetics, absurd. 
 Contact Information 
sollars_md@TSU.EDU 
 
 
 
 
 
Kafka, Giacometti, and Beckett have long confounded followers and admirers, for the 
creative work of these three artists is often judged by audiences as falling into the realm 
of the inexplicable if not inaccessible in terms of definitive understanding. There exists 
an impasse between certain artists, their art, and viewers. In such instances as Waiting for 
Godot and Endgame, Beckett’s aesthetics resist audience intersection and interpretation, 
leaving a continuing gap of some magnitude between object and subject. This interesting 
separation can be compared to the asymptote, a graphic figure from analytic geometry in 
which the ray of a curve continues to run closer and closer to a set line but never over-
laps the line, even as the distance between the two only appears to approach zero as the 
rays tend off toward infinity. Comprehension and object fail to meet. Identifying Beckett 
as the ray of the curve that seems to move closer to the line of intelligibility offers a 
graphic instance of the relationship. Beckett, who is perhaps more aware of his own fis-
sures than the other artists of their own, confesses in Disjecta: “There are many ways in 
which the thing I am trying in vain to say may be tried in vain to be said” (144). 
Grappling for their own understanding of Beckett’s work, critics add confusion to a 
work’s interpretation and reader response. Vivian Mercier, an Irish reviewer, wrote in 
1956 that Beckett’s “Waiting for Godot has achieved a theoretical impossibility—a play in 
which nothing happens, that yet keeps audiences glued to their seats. What’s more, since 
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the second act is a subtly different reprise of the first, he has written a play in which 
nothing happens twice” (6). This response is in itself code-layered, as it only continues, if 
not heightens, the enigmatic play’s reception. There are two acts in Waiting for Godot, a 
point which accounts for the definitive “happens twice.” But what about the two words 
“nothing happens”? There is a lot that goes on in the two acts: characters move about 
onstage, make entrances and exits, exchange dialogue, make faces, and think. Conse-
quently, something is going on; and, paradoxically, nothing is not going on.  
The intersection of these three twentieth-century artists in terms of the complex, of-
ten inscrutable, concept of the absurdity recognized in their epistemological approaches 
to aesthetics is the focus of this paper. The aesthetical absurd is defined as a measure of 
the distance or gap, however wide or narrow, that separates, and sometimes degrades, 
the artistic impulse or will toward creation from the physical reality of that incarnation. 
This is the incommensurability of the artist and creation. This means that a measure of 
distance persists between the author’s intent or desire or will and the resultant manifesta-
tion. In simplistic terms, one can turn to popular song lyrics: “You can’t always get what 
you want.” 
 
 
Cognitive poetics, as identified by Reuven Tsur, Peter Stockwell, and others, offers 
meaningful insight into this aesthetic asymmetry predicament existing between artist and 
art. At the vanguard of literary criticism, cognitive poetics has dug in at the frontline of 
the interpretation of literary texts and art objects. As a perspective focused on the read-
er’s cognitive categories, cognitive poetics has borrowed from the New Critics and read-
er-response critical methodology, and yet remains cognizant of the value of biographical, 
archetypal, modernism, postmodernism, deconstruction, and other views. These fore-
runners have been in the past lavishly applied to Kafka’s The Trial, Giacometti’s Man 
Walking, and Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, yielding thus far mixed and often disappointing 
results. In the present day, cognitive poetics that relies in part on empirical approaches to 
creative mental constructs is used here as a lens through which to examine these artists’ 
works. 
Applications of cognitive poetics consist of a three-fold approach: a close adherence 
to the work, focus on reader-response outcomes, and the application of principles relat-
ed to cognitive science. Cognitive poetics is an effort to apply identifiable tools of the 
science of the mind to the understanding of aesthetics. Clearly adherents of this move-
ment anticipate their research to identify an evolutionary step in the study of aesthetics, 
although the step has not yet landed those subscribers to cognitive poetics on firm 
ground. Not yet, anyway. As the understanding and tools of cognition have developed 
rapidly over the past four decades, it is logical to apply these present-day empirical tools 
and findings to the realm of sensuous aesthetics. Part of that evolutionary hope is that 
the footprint taken toward greater understanding of the link between art and science is 
toward the high ground, a mesa or even summit, well above the marshland of Postmod-
ernism and its offspring, relativism. 
Scientific approaches in cognition applied to aesthetics offer potential insight, as long 
as the grip does not become a vise or the direction become overtly forced and pragmatic. 
Merlin Donald in “Art and Cognitive Evolution” offers the questionable view that “Art 
should be regarded as a specific kind of cognitive engineering. As a first principle, art is 
an activity intended to influence the minds of an audience. It involves the deliberate con-
struction of representations that affect how people (including the artist) view the world” 
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(4). Beckett, in particular, was not one who saw the first duty of the artist to please audi-
ences.   
Unlike the New Critics, cognitive poetics privileges reader over author, a view that 
diminishes the creative element in cognitive poetics. It is true that we cannot qualify the 
artist’s mental content at the time of a work’s creation, but yet examinations of the art-
ist’s particular creative process, to whatever extent this is possible, should not be ig-
nored. The uneasy relationship between Kafka, for instance, and the reader can be fairly 
assessed as one of incommensurability. The ideas expressed in the words chosen by 
Kafka, the author, whatever he knew the ideas to be, fall at times out of sync or register 
with a reader’s receptivity. This disorientation, or parity violation, is evident in the text’s 
disjointed images, confused causal action, fragmentation, and incomplete manuscripts. 
Gregor Samsa’s transformation in The Metamorphosis into a beetle remains open to a range 
of interpretations: Marxist, gender, deconstruction, and others. A blurring results in the 
reader’s cognitive understanding, similar to the smudgy printing that results when the 
four colors on a printing press are not in proper alignment. This impediment toward a 
cognitive harmonic realization in outcomes leads to a continuous reader-response impasse. 
This falls outside what Tsur describes in Some Aspects of Cognitive Poetics as the two 
ways readers accept words and concepts as stimuli for understanding: rapid and delayed 
categorization. The former is a reader who progresses without incident through a text as 
a driver down a familiar lane toward home; the latter is the reader who is confronted by 
delays, road hazards, missed road signs, and other perils of the journey, but nevertheless 
considers them critically and drives forward. Poetic expression has escaped, “in the lin-
guistic medium, from the tyranny of clear-cut conceptual categories” (Tsur, Some Aspects 
280). He maintains that people who resist uncertainty and ambiguity in readings are 
prone to gravitate toward rapid categorization, but in doing so they may miss the various 
rich aesthetic layers below the top soil. 
This impasse can lead to a deadlock in transferability of content between reader and 
work. But the reader, being empowered by the culture of reader-response privilege, is 
not content with this stalemate in the game. The reader is like the barbarian intent on 
overrunning the writer’s castle perched on the hilltop. His act is to fell the castle and 
make the edifice his own. Before sacking the castle walls to break open the meaning of 
the text, the reader may actually praise the lord for his fine tapestries and other precious 
trophies, but this is merely a ruse, and he is nevertheless unsatisfied until the trophy be-
longs to him. He alone can better judge the value of the trophy. But this sacking of the 
castle for possession of the icon all presupposes that, as in the question if an artistic 
work affords meaning, that the rich icons are actually stored in the castle vault, and the 
siege is not predicated on a heightened or overvalued reverence for favored canonical 
works. This represents a strategic change from the reader-response approach to the art-
ist-work examination. And for this reason this paper does not take up the argument re-
garding Postmodern’s favored position on the validity of acceptable multiple meanings 
found in a work of art.  
The author-work equation should be scrutinized for equity in the value of all terms: 
rational and irrational. Is there a measure of X degree that an author’s work can be found 
to be out of step with the author’s own impulse, and, when this is the case, then evi-
dence for the telltale aesthetical absurd is identified. Rather than faithfully accepting a 
work as complete, fully unified, in harmonic convergence, its constellation of myriad im-
ages gravitationally intact, and complete with meaning and intention, the work must sit in 
the docket for a critical inspection by way of aesthetic interpretation. This approach priv-
Kafkaesque Absurdity 
Michael D. Sollars 
 
Enthymema, VIII 2013, p. 74 
http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/enthymema 
 
ileges the object as possessing an aesthetic status, and does not consider the work as a 
historical piece, wherein its value is given weight due to its age and social and cultural poli-
tics. 
The aesthetical absurd differs from Albert Camus’ more traditional absurd which 
tends toward recognition of the distance between two other positions: the individual’s 
perspective and a brute exterior world. In one instance, this entails the individual’s exist-
ence and the fleeting time he or she has on this earth. That absurd is a measurement be-
tween the desire for human attainment and meaning in the face of a damning realization 
that man has been shortchanged in this pursuit by the blade of mortality. Why strive 
when death awaits? Events in one’s daily life call attention to the absurd as one becomes 
conscious of how one wastes away precious hours on the tasks of getting on and along 
in life. In another case, one has a concept of perfect justice, but the actual encounters fall 
far short of that Platonic ideal, and this gap leads to the frustration recognized as the ab-
surd. For some the desire for a benevolent and involved God is pitted against the aware-
ness of an indifferent, if not hostile, universe. This is the French author and philoso-
pher’s widely accepted existential absurd. 
Camus does not address the aesthetical asymmetry. This absurd is the separation be-
tween what the author desires, his or her impulse, to create or recreate, an emotive or 
psychic craving, and the limitations of the artist’s own ability and the imperfection of his 
or her tools, words in the case of writers, to bring into physical form that personal ideal 
vision. This reiterates the subject-object problem. With many Modernist artists the sub-
ject-object dilemma was cast anew. Rather than the Neoclassical position, in which the 
object stood across the room in an objective position from the artist, and the Romantic 
fusion of the two terms or entities, to where they both sat in close proximity, even side 
by side, the later Modernist took note of the external world or object, considered it at 
some length, employed it in the work, but soon found the object, which had served as 
the catalyst, so to speak, now to appear at odds with the inner vision of the artist. Essen-
tially, the artist brackets and even erases the object from the canvas, and does so by ne-
cessity and not choice.   
There exists a noted history that recognizes the curious relationship between art and 
cognition. Literature of the absurd as with Camus’ “The Myth of Sisyphus” and The 
Stranger spawned insights into the precarious human condition, and this led to more ex-
acting ontological questions demanded by existential literature and philosophy such as 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism and No Exit and Martin Buber’s I and Thou. 
These two literary and philosophical antecedents opened the door to what neurologist 
and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl pioneered as logotherapy, partly in his book Man’s Search 
for Meaning, a psychological examination and treatment focused on the value of one’s au-
thentic existence. Today, cognitive poetics seeks to build on this past by the use of em-
pirical concepts and tools. Current research into cognition and creativity includes Terry 
Dartnall in Creativity, Cognition, and Knowledge: An Interaction (2002); John A. McCarthy in 
Remapping Reality: Chaos and Creativity in Science and Literature (2006); and Mark Turner in 
The Artful Mind: Cognitive Science and the Riddle of Human Creativity (2006). 
Kafka comes first. The work of the German-language writer from Prague functions 
as a key to an exacting understanding of the problematic aesthetics of the later Giaco-
metti and Beckett. This focus pinpoints one of the central scenes in the writer’s novel, 
The Trial, and this is “The Painter” in Chapter 7. Joseph K, the protagonist, is belea-
guered by his sudden arrest and his subsequent prolonged entanglement within the mys-
terious courts. He does not know why he was arrested or the nature of the charges 
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against him. To help his troubled defense, he seeks the help from many people, one of 
whom is the painter Titorelli, a person whom has been recommended by Mr. Block, a 
tradesman, who has also fallen into the same snare of the malevolent court system.  
The painter lives in a dilapidated tenement building in a decaying neighborhood. The 
reader discovers later in the chapter, as Joseph K does, that the building sits adjacent to 
the court offices, allowing the interpretation that the courts are ubiquitous. As K ap-
proaches the tenement building at the beginning of the chapter, he sees a broken hole in 
the wall that serves as a crude doorway entrance. His advance is marked by the encoun-
ter of a “repulsive, yellow, streaming liquid […] causing some rats to scurry away.” He 
sees a small child lying on its belly in the street, but its cries are drowned out by the noise 
of nearby workmen. A hunchback girl of thirteen is the leader of a group of young mis-
creant girls, and this female retinue serves as a chorus in the chapter. Their faces “reveal 
a mixture of childishness and depravity” (142). 
A plethora of images, graphic and dizzying metaphors and symbols, infiltrate the 
chapter. Additional images include hidden doorways, paintings of judges and landscapes, 
suffocating atmosphere in the studio, etc. According to this author’s count, twenty two 
images cluster in this chapter. Someone else’s list would no doubt vary in the tabulation, 
but the exact number of images is not crucial. I present a count so as to magnify the 
magnitude of what appear as disparate images. What is important, rather, is the type, use 
of, and aggregate of these Kafkaesque images.  
The comingling of the words “childishness” and “depravity,” for instance, begs the 
question as to what sort of children are these when we first meet them? The word de-
pravity, for instance, may suggest to readers a wide spectrum of connotations and imag-
es, ranging from prostitutes, street urchins, runaways, to the more acceptable connota-
tion of unclean or unhealthy. Depravity, an open-ended term, resists certainty. Kafka’s 
words used to name physical objects or emotions offer only approximations and not ex-
actitude in terms of translatability and transference of intelligibility. Cognitively, a reader 
must grab words and fit them into his or her own constellation of concepts and experi-
ential meanings. Add to this cluster of images the crying child lying in the street and the 
indifferent workmen, plus the rat and yellow ooze. The reader must add these together 
to affix a mental construct from the collection of words. These words or images are in 
free play, echoing Jacques Derrida, in Kafka’s funhouse. Kafka is not seeking to claim 
ownership over meaning, but he is suggesting meaning and identity, and this turning 
loose of meaning shifts responsibility to the reader.   
Kafka’s painter, looking disheveled and dressed in only his nightshirt, answers Joseph 
K’s knock at the door. He reveals that he is an influential friend of the courts, and serves 
as the court painter of the many powerful judges. Titorelli then informs Joseph K of the 
three forms of acquittal available through the courts. These are absolute acquittal, appar-
ent acquittal, and deferment. Titorelli’s explanation of these legal possibilities is voiced in 
a very discursive, empirical, and logical manner. But Joseph K soon realizes that none of 
the forms of acquittal will actually free him from the courts’ pernicious reach and scruti-
ny. Absolute acquittal has never been conferred on any defendant, and the other two 
forms require a lifetime of continued active defense and prostrations before the courts. 
Joseph K plunges deeper into the realization of the absurdity of his predicament as a de-
fendant. But this absurdity in the storyline, certainly reverberating later with Camus, is 
understood in light of the obvious irony between the words shaping a logical framework 
and the reality of outcomes. Here again organization is transparent. The painter offers 
three forms of legal outcome, again betraying the author’s manipulation, for the notion 
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of Kafka’s three is as fundamental in storytelling, if not clichéd, as three strikes and 
you’re out. It is the structure of the three explanations that frames the reader’s experi-
ence at this point, as there well could have been a longer list of possible outcomes.  
An important image surfaces later in the studio. Joseph K shows surprise when he fi-
nally recognizes a figure of justice in one of the artist’s paintings. “Now I see,” said K., 
“here’s the blindfold and here are the scales. But aren’t those wings on her heels, and 
isn’t she moving?” “Yes,” said the painter, “I had to paint it like that according to the 
contract. It’s actually the figure of justice and the goddess of victory all in one” (182). Jo-
seph K argues that equipping the woman of justice with wings on her heels will render 
justice as unstable. “That is not a good combination,” said K. with a smile. “Justice needs 
to remain still, otherwise the scales will move about and it won’t be possible to make a 
just verdict.” “I’m just doing what the client wanted,” said the painter. (182). The painter 
confesses that he has never seen the lady of justice or the throne that is shown with the 
seated judges in the painting, but that he has invented the images based on the judges’ 
instructions.  
Kafka’s structure in the chapter offers a more exact empirical analysis. The form is 
straightforward, balanced in action, and reveals the skill and presence of the author’s 
hand. Joseph K’s entrance and exit from the building frame the chapter. His discernible 
goal is to meet the painter and learn what, if anything, the painter can do to aid his de-
fense, which he succeeds in doing. The knowledge gained is far from reassuring to the 
protagonist, in that he learns that he has little chance of ever escaping the omnipresent 
court system. Meanwhile, the crowd of young girls, acting as a Greek chorus, appears 
and reappears at timed intervals. Their presence marks the secondary action, as they en-
ter and exit the story to deflect the weight of attention from the main action. The organ-
ization of the short section is finely wrought. The bones of the chapter furnish a confi-
dent sense that this is a pocket of the real world, all the while a collection of intriguing, 
uncomfortable, and jarring odd images swarm about. 
The New Critics in the first half of the twentieth century emphasized a close reading 
of the text and regarded the literary work as sacrosanct vessel: a self-contained, self-
referential aesthetic object. They favored the author over the reader. Each word and im-
age is considered necessary and not conditional in the construction of the integrity of the 
whole. Images are not merely ornamental, but integral to the complete work. Cognitive 
poetics follows this emphasis on close textual analysis, with its cornerstone principle as 
the interpretability of the poetic language. What, if anything, do these images add up to? 
Do they coalesce? How are they more than decorative? Can studies of the mind and its 
fabricated images help to explain these metaphors in ways that earlier critical theories 
have not? Each image viewed independently can be examined in detail if delayed cogni-
tive assessment is afforded. The yellow ooze can be explained in a realm of possibilities, 
but not in a definitive sense like the more narrowly pregnant simile. Kafka’s images paint 
a landscape, and this is contrasted to the serene landscape paintings Joseph K finds in 
Titorelli’s studio.   
Kafka’s final product, the outcome from an ideal impulse and reality, must be ques-
tioned, and this excludes accepting any intentional certainty, known or not known. And, 
of course, the reader cannot know to what degree the author knew what his intentions 
were in the writing process. The focal point is not on the reader’s frustrated attempts to 
piece together Kafka’s puzzling and often uncompleted manuscript into that unified and 
explanatory whole, to make sense of it, to solve its riddles, like that of the parable Before 
the Law, but rather the focus here falls on the evidence at hand that points to the au-
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thor’s uncertainty about his own manuscripts. This differs from Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
intentional fallacy, that the reader cannot know the author’s intention or thought process 
regarding a creative work. Their position neither affirms nor negates authorial certainty. 
They, rather, contend that it cannot be known. The position presented here differs, with 
the shift of focus to the uncertainty of the work’s integrity. Is it watertight in terms of 
lacking cracks and flaws? In the Kafkaesque, readers can only approach meaning, never 
reach the goal of understanding, unity, and wholeness. The work at hand is the primary 
evidence. So too this casts the same light on the author’s predicament of his or her own 
work. This is not always because the artist has deftly eluded us or hidden the keys to 
meaning in clever ciphers. A counter argument is that the artist like Kafka struggled with 
meaning, vision, and corporeality. The evidence lies in the work itself. 
Although literature became Kafka’s method of understanding himself and the world, 
he “took a dim view of artistic ‘truth’” in the revelation of his aesthetic skepticism 
(Corngold 141). But Kafka’s work was not by necessity a form of mental therapy, but 
writing as an obsession toward self-expression and creation. In his letters, Kafka wrote 
about “The tremendous world I have inside my head” (Diaries, 1910-1913 288). While 
the statement contains a sense of aesthetic drive, it is not a unique revelation among art-
ists or humanity in general. 
David Constantine in “Kafka’s writing and our reading” explores the domain of the 
author’s questioning of his own abilities: “Was there ever a writer so convinced of fail-
ure? All writers are, more or less. Failure is intrinsic in writing. It is there most palpably 
in the gap between conception and realization” (15). 
Stanley Corngold in Lambent Traces: Franz Kafka addresses Kafka’s creative impulse in 
terms of its complexity and inherent irrational appearance. Kafka at moments betrays an 
equivocal position regarding his writing, as he dismisses much of his journal writing as a 
“heap of straw.” Self-doubt leads the author in a struggle to comprehend his mental 
state: “My state is not unhappiness,” he writes, “but it is also not happiness, not indiffer-
ence, not weakness, not fatigue, not another interest—so what is it then?” (quoted in 
Corngold 21). Corngold follows Kafka’s journals: “This feels like a moment of ardent 
enough self-questioning, for here, too, the (diary) entry enacts its own argument: ‘That I 
do not know this is probably connected with my inability to write’” (21).  
Corngold: “It is not enough to say ‘I do not know.’ What, after all, is the cause of 
Kafka’s ‘inability to write’? There would be some profit in getting to the root of this ina-
bility” (21). 
Kafka recognizes the gaps in his awareness and the questions the capability of his cre-
ative process. He draws on the metaphor of a simple blade of grass: 
 
all those things […] which occur to me, occur to me not from the root up but rather only 
from somewhere about their middle. Let someone then attempt to seize them, let some-
one attempt to seize a blade of grass and hold fast to it when it begins to grow only from 
the middle. (quoted in Corngold 21) 
 
The artist sees the blade of grass, like the story or novel, not germinating from a seed 
or from the gestation point, but after the vision has already partially gained form and de-
veloped.  
Corngold adds: 
 
The blade of grass, Kafka’s thought, does not grow from the root up; hence, its way of 
growing, its way of being, cannot be traced back to the root. Kafka cannot get to the bot-
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tom of his thought. Between his being and any thoroughgoing self-knowledge that might 
arise from thinking, there is disparity—a gap between the root and the middle. (25) 
 
Every fair narration of what occurs in thought would have to begin in medias res.  
This summation of Kafka’s aesthetics very clearly echoes statements made later by 
Beckett: “it is likely that all of Kafka’s stories and novels will reflect this drama of writ-
ing, the inability to write, and the impossibility of not writing.” Beckett in Disjecta plays 
with his readers by talking about the artist’s “fidelity to failure” (Corngold 145).   
The Swiss sculptor and painter Alberto Giacometti, although perhaps lesser known 
than Kafka and Beckett in literary critical circles, remains regarded as one of the most 
original artists of the twentieth century. He is recognized today for his disturbing and 
perplexing human shapes, figures like Man Pointing (1947), Walking Man I (1960), and Tall 
Figure II and Tall Figure III (1960). These works are not mimetic in the classical sense of 
portraying the ideal or real contours of the human body, as with Michelangelo’s David, 
but are works that present the human figure at the other end of the spectrum, that of ex-
treme attenuation. They pose a question about the ontological nature of humankind ra-
ther than attempting to affirm existence.  
Giacometti’s figures like Man Walking are hardly recognizable of human reality. His 
figures are elongated and emaciated, ashy and burnt-out. Giacometti’s faces and bodies 
appear to be hacked and knifed in coarse manner. They more resemble figures following 
the Holocaust or the burned bodies after a nuclear apocalypse. Although he worked 
from models, often using his brother, his figures bear little or no resemblance to those 
models. His aesthetic process is that he worked at a piece of clay by steadily carving away 
at the form, resulting in the full body, arms and legs ultimately reduced to matchstick thin 
size, essentially skeletal form. His process is reductionist, creation through destruction. 
He recognized the presence of the divide between the vision and reality. His vision 
took over the object, changing and reducing it to an essence of his vision, and the result 
was the many skeletal forms in space. James Lord, Giacometti’s noted biographer, re-
veals:  
 
The more I looked at the model . . . the more the screen between his reality and mine 
grew thicker. One starts by seeing the person who poses, but little by little all the possible 
sculptures of him intervene. The more real vision of him disappears, the stranger his head 
becomes. One is no longer sure of his appearance, or of his size, or of anything at all. 
There were too many sculptures between my model and me. And when there were no 
sculptures, there was such a complete stranger that I no longer know whom I saw or what 
I was looking at. (Giacometti 165) 
 
Lord examines the artist’s limitations: 
 
we [are] confronted by the utter impossibility of what Giacometti is attempting to do. A 
semblance, an illusion is, in any case, obviously all that can be attained, and he knows it. 
But an illusion is not enough. This inadequacy becomes literally day by day, I think, less 
acceptable, less tolerable — almost in a physical sense — even as he strives to go on, to go 
further. There is always, perhaps, a possibility of going a little further, not very far but a lit-
tle further, and in the realm of the absolute a little is limitless. It is this possibility, I think, 
that gives to Giacometti’s work such arresting intensity, an intensity that has increased 
with time. But it may also be that it is just this possibility which has made it more and 
more difficult for him to produce work that seems conventionally ‘finished.’ (A Giacometti 
Portrait 91) 
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Other scholars have described Giacometti as the artist of negation, deformity, attenu-
ation, but that is to argue that that is either the intended outcome or how we view the 
work.  This falls within the reader-response view. According to Cecile Nebel’s The Dark 
Side of Creativity: Blocks, Unfinished Works, and the Urge to Destroy, Giacometti realized that 
his paintings were never finished. And if a work is never finished can it then be com-
plete, particularly in reference to an ideal unified whole? Giacometti confessed to Alex-
ander Watt that certainty about a work was out of the grasp of even the artist. 
 
This was due in large part to the difficulty of grasping as a coherent system or whole what 
David Sylvester excellently summarizes as the accumulation of memories none of which is 
quite the same as any other, because each of them is affected by what has gone before, by 
the continually changing relation between all that has already been put down and the next 
glance at the model. (Nebel 122-23) 
 
Giacometti’s work explores the realm of defamiliarization, which was not a new con-
cept even in the middle decades of the twentieth century, but one that the artist elevated 
to new understanding and recognition. He found that to encourage more intensity from 
viewers, the artist must produce the known images in an unfamiliar manner. 
 
In defamiliarizing it he transformed it to such a degree that he felt lost, unable to formu-
late another way of seeing things and making them hang together. He was in a no man’s 
land where traditional points of view no longer worked; he had to grope to find new ones. 
This was because the reality he painted became uncertain: The sculptor said, ‘its projection 
in my head is uncertain or partial’. (Nebel 123) 
 
Lord documents Giacometti’s claim that he did not paint his vision of things but a 
residue of this vision as well as his consciousness of it. This consciousness grasped for-
ward toward an uncertain goal due to the changing landscape of mental images that dart 
as shards in and out of moments of time. He wanted to give a whole, fully integrated 
representation but could not succeed—he found his vision too volatile. As a result, he 
neither had nor could have a theory to help him fit the discontinuous nature of what he 
saw into a unified pattern. 
Nebel emphasizes the prevalent position that Giacometti, following the Impressionists 
and Surrealists, wanted to possess the experience of reality and not the reality itself. He is 
clearly putting forth his experience of reality, but we need to weigh on a finer scale what 
Giacometti’s experience of reality is. His work begins with impressions, as all thought 
must, considering Locke’s basic work in mental understanding and cognition. Giacometti 
employed models, often his wife Annette and his brother Diego. Some of his sculptures 
bear resemblances to his models, but many depart in an extraordinary manner from the 
original bodies, including Bust of Carola, done in 1959, based on Paola Carola. This vision 
stands at war with reality: refutes and denies it. 
The reality that Giacometti begins with is almost absent and negated at the end. The 
models he uses bear little if any resemblance to the finished form. More clearly, the 
model and reality get in the way of the mind’s vision and creation, two separate forms of 
cognition. 
Samuel Beckett is the final artist discussed here. The Irish dramatist wrote much of 
his work in French and received the Nobel prize for literature in 1969. Beckett is recog-
nized for his astonishing and bewildering images, those like Winnie buried up to her 
neck in a mound of earth in Happy Days and Hamm’s aging, legless parents, Nagg and 
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Nell, peeking out of trash cans in Endgame. These images haunt theatregoers long after 
the curtain falls. Beckett, first pointed out as an absurdist dramatist by Martin Esslin in 
his1961 text The Theatre of the Absurd, is the creator of the poetic drama, static drama, 
drama painted with stationary images and symbols. 
Beckett’s link to Giacometti is a direct one. The two artists were friends in Paris and 
collaborated on designing a tree as a prop for a 1966 production of Waiting for Godot at 
the Oleon Theatre in the French capital.  
The tragi-comedy Waiting for Godot has gained a wide and iconic familiarity since its 
debut in 1951. It is a play that portrays two tramps named Vladimir and Estragon who in 
the two simple acts patiently wait the arrival of someone named Godot, a character who 
never takes the stage. It is perhaps a drama built around the human predicament of wait-
ing and how to pass the time.  
My focus falls on one element from Beckett’s seminal play that can, arguably, be said 
to encompass or represent many of the images cast in Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre, as that 
single element absorbs and encompasses most others. This is the tree in Waiting for Godot. 
The tree is the lone stage prop on the boards, beyond the poor paper moon hanging in 
the sky. The tree functions to mark the physical location at which the characters meet 
and talk along a country road. They never stray far from the tree. A similar focus is evi-
dent in the mound of earth in which Winnie is buried in Happy Days. The tape recorder 
in Krapp’s Last Tape is another such central metaphor. 
Beckett’s tree falls into an open-ended, enigmatic cluster of Beckettian images. Stand-
ing on a barren country road, it is small, diminutive, sort of on the scale of a Charlie 
Brown Christmas tree, propped up by Beckett in what can only be referred to as a land-
scape from T. S. Eliot’s Waste Land. The tree stands poor in stature and poorer in foliage. 
It is, to put it plainly, unremarkable. Perhaps that is the author’s intent. Besides marking 
the stage, the tree functions to further the dialogue and plot. Estragon and Vladimir, the 
two hobo tramps in the play, look at it from time to time and foolishly talk about hang-
ing themselves from its thin branches. The puzzlement of time, change, and action is 
furthered by this very tree. 
Beckett invited his friend Giacometti to construct this tree for the play’s perfor-
mance. Giacometti had never developed scenes or props for the theatre. The collabora-
tion was far from fruitful. According to Giacometti’s biographer, James Lord, “Alberto 
made a marvelously curvaceous, dendriform creation in plaster” (Giacometti 429). But 
Giacometti and Beckett both met the result of the creation with misgivings. They 
worked through the night trying to perfect the tree, to bring their idea of the tree to frui-
tion. Giacometti said that “we tried to make that plaster tree larger or smaller, its branch-
es more slender. It never seemed right, and each of us said to the other: maybe” (Giaco-
metti 429). 
The image of the tree wasn’t exactly right. There was a recognition that a violation in 
parity, however narrow or wide, existed between the artistic thought, the ideal, and the 
actuality given to the thought. This recognition of “maybe” is what Beckett terms, fa-
mously, the inevitable failure of the artist, and this is the artist’s duty. Beckett says in 
Worstward Ho, “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better” (89). 
What does Beckett mean by failure? Perhaps that the artist fails to realize fully his crea-
tive impulse in the physical world. Words themselves, the blood of the playwright’s crea-
tion, hamper the very creation they are intended to facilitate. 
Drama, like sculpture, ultimately forces the artist’s hand. The playwright/director 
must manifest objects for the physical world by putting them on the stage. These images 
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have definition, shape and edge, dimension, finite form. Beckett’s tree, at one time safely 
hiding in the creative realm of the play’s text, must be forced out of the birth canal to be 
born in the physical world. On stage, it stands a concretion, no longer enjoying or as-
suming the multitudinous forms freely called forth in the mind of readers. With Kafka’s 
Titorelli and his attic studio in the text of the novel, each reader paints his or her own 
picture. Onstage, the dramatist’s props and characters are physically defined and present.  
Lord adds that Giacometti and Beckett, 
 
Driven beyond the conscious self by a need to express what defies expression, found the 
strength to sustain that need in the ironic authority derived from a mortifying acknowl-
edgement of failure. Beckett had learned that words are powerless to convey an idea or 
feeling, just as Giacometti had found that neither paint nor clay can possibly embody the 
experience of vision. (Giacometti 337) 
 
A noted passage found in Disjecta offers Beckett’s attitude toward art: “to be an artist 
is to fail, as no other dare fail, that failure in his world and the shrink from it desertion.” 
He goes on to talk about “this fidelity to failure, as a new occasion, a new term of rela-
tion, and of the act which, unable to act, obliged to act, he makes, an expressive act, even 
if only of itself, of its impossibility, of its obligation” (145). 
In conclusion, Kafka, Giacometti, and Beckett represent artists for whom the argu-
ment for the aesthetic absurd seems a valid measure of their works. As noted earlier, 
Camus makes no note of this troubled condition, this aesthetic asymmetry, at odds with-
in the artist. In his work “Absurd Creation,” there is brief mention of the human contra-
diction, not in the logic of thought itself, but in the struggle between the thought and the 
creative act. This dimension of the absurd is that separation between the will, the im-
pulse toward creation, and the consequent difficult manifestation of that unpremeditated 
idea into physical reality. The aesthetic absurd maintains itself as a proximal zone, no 
man’s land, contested territory, where the artist struggles not with the audience but with 
his own abilities. 
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